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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 DEAN DILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to Fordham 
Law School. I am Matthew Diller. I have the honor of being the Dean of 
this great law school. 
Aside from the rain, I would say welcome to a typical Friday 
afternoon at Fordham Law School. We have, of course, today’s fantastic 
program, which you will be both hearing more about from me in a 
moment and then experiencing; across the hall, there is a major 
conference on the vanishing civil trial and its implications for our system 
of justice; and upstairs is a third major symposium on urban transportation 
issues in the twenty-first century. All of these are sponsored, hosted, and 
put together by our student journals. We are very fortunate here. Having 
said that, I do not mean to lure you from here because, frankly, all of you 
have picked a great conference to attend. Thank you for joining us. 
Today, we will be talking about “Political Corruption: Afflicting 
America and Affairs Abroad.” This subject does not need much 
introduction since it is in the headlines every day. It is a subject that is 
always, unfortunately, timely. However, today it seems even more timely. 
We are in a state where the heads of both of our houses of legislature were 
recently convicted;1 we are all watching the major trial across the river in 
New Jersey;2 and, of course, there are pending investigations concerning 
a number of our other political leaders.3 And that is just the local story. 
This conference focuses not just on the local context but on the 
global as well. Corruption is on the forefront there: most prominently, a 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Benjamin Weiser & Vivian Yee, Dean Skelos Is Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison 
in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/ 
nyregion/dean-skelos-is-sentenced-to-5-years-in-prison-in-corruption-case.html?rref=co 
llection%2Fnewseventcollection%2FAlbany%20on%20Trial [https://perma.cc/L5V9-2 
H7M]; Benjamin Weiser & Vivian Yee, Sheldon Silver, Ex-New York Assembly Speaker, 
Gets 12-Year Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), http://www.nytime 
s.com/2016/05/04/nyregion/sheldon-silver-ex-new-york-assembly-speaker-gets-12-year 
-prison-sentence.html [https://perma.cc/LVS6-JZX6]. 
 2. Kate Zernike, 2 Ex-Christie Allies Are Convicted in George Washington Bridge 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/05/nyregion/bridge 
gate-conviction.html [https://perma.cc/MT2E-FGJE]. 
 3. E.g., Christine Hauser, Aaron Schock, Ex-Illinois Congressman, Is Indicted, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/politics/aaron-sch 
ock-ex-illinois-congressman-indicted-wire-fraud.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8Q9U-W 
67Y]. 
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corruption scandal recently brought down the government in Brazil.4 But 
you have also been reading about the scandals concerning the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”); even the sports and 
athletics that we are most passionate about have been tainted with 
corruption.5 
So, there is a lot to talk about in terms of how legal regimes intersect 
and can prevent and respond to corruption. We have a great group of 
people here to do that today. I want to thank, in particular, Professors 
Caroline Gentile and Sean Griffith for their immense contributions as 
faculty advisors to our Journal of Corporate & Financial Law. 
And lest it go unsaid, today’s program is sponsored by our Journal 
of Corporate & Financial Law, which was founded in 1995 and has 
grown to become one of the premier student-edited business law journals 
in the country. In fact, it is the number one most-cited specialty journal in 
banking and finance.6 We are tremendously proud of the Journal and all 
the work that our students do on it and the programs they organize. 
I will also say that this program is organized in coordination with the 
Fordham Corporate Law Center, which is one of our flagship programs 
directed by Professor Sean Griffith, whom you will all hear from in a 
moment. Please be sure to pick up the calendar of fall events for the 
Center because there are a lot of other great things ahead. 
I also want to welcome back to the Law School our alum Tim 
Treanor, who is on the panel, as well as our other guests, and to thank the 
students of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for 
today’s great program and all your work. 
In particular, I want to thank Giselle Sedano, who is a fourth-year 
student in our evening program. Ms. Sedano works full time as a 
compliance officer at Fortress Investment Group, a publicly traded, 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Simon Romero, Dilma Rousseff Is Ousted as Brazil’s President in Impeachment 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/ 
world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/H9K8-FJQK]. 
 5. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Venezuelan Soccer Official Pleads Guilty; Promises to Repay 
Millions in FIFA Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/ 
11/sports/soccer/fifa-venezuelan-soccer-official-pleads-guilty.html [https://perma.cc/PE 
2M-ASHT]. 
 6. See Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 2008 – 2015, WASH. & LEE UNIV. 
SCH. LAW, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx (search using the follow criteria: 
“Subject: Banking and Finance”; “Edit Type: Student-edited”; and “Ranking Criteria: 
Case Cites”). 
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highly diversified global investment management firm, and will be 
joining the firm of Ropes & Gray next fall. I want to thank you, Giselle, 
for putting together today’s program, along with all the rest of our Journal 
editors. 
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PANEL I: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you for the very kind introduction, 
Dean Diller, and good afternoon to everyone. The Fordham Journal of 
Corporate & Financial Law is excited to welcome you here today to our 
annual symposium. Moreover, we are honored to have a truly wonderful 
panel of leading scholars and prominent attorneys to share their insights 
and their expertise surrounding corruption. We have, as Dean Diller 
mentioned, a Fordham Law School alumnus Tim Treanor, Class of 1995, 
who is a Partner and Global Co-leader of the white-collar criminal defense 
and investigations practice of Sidley Austin; Professor Sean J. Griffith 
from Fordham Law School, who is the T.J. Maloney Chair in Business 
Law and Director of the Corporate Law Center; Zachary Brez, who is a 
Partner and Co-chair of the business and securities litigation practice of 
Ropes & Gray; Michael J. Cohn, who is Global Chief Compliance Officer 
and Deputy General Counsel of Fortress Investment Group LLC; and we 
have Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman, who is the Henry R. Luce 
Professor of Jurisprudence of Law and Political Science at Yale 
University. 
As history demonstrates, the world has not been shortchanged of bad 
actors willing to facilitate corruption, particularly through the provision 
and receipt of bribes. The problem of corruption is found in the United 
States and virtually in every other nation in the world. It is a blight; it 
disrespects good governance and the rule of law, creates moral and 
political dilemmas, hinders economic development, infringes human 
rights, and distorts competitive conditions. 
When Edson Arantes do Nascimento, more known as Pelé, a 
professional Brazilian soccer player celebrated as one of the greatest 
players in the sport, described soccer as “the beautiful game,” the world 
ardently agreed.7 He felt that he owed the game, not that the game owed 
him.8 Football is played on the poor streets of third world countries as 
much as it is played in the most affluent nations. While Pelé expressed 
that he owed the game, those involved in the massive FIFA corruption 
scheme, which came to light through the recent Department of Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Barney Corkhill, Jogo Bonito: The Beautiful Game, BLEACHER REPORT (Oct. 16, 
2008), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/69649-jogo-bonito-the-beautiful-game [htt 
ps://perma.cc/2YG9-6BQW]. 
 8. Id. 
2017]      POLITICAL CORRUPTION: AFFLICTING AMERICA 507 
                                       AND AFFAIRS ABROAD 
investigations,9 operated as though the game owed them by exploiting 
their positions for decades to enrich their own pockets. They are not the 
sole actors of corrupt acts. 
We hope today to engender an honest discussion about corruption; 
normally, honesty is a rarity when you speak about corruption. There will 
be two panel discussions. The first will focus on the political economy of 
corruption, and will be led by Professor Griffith and Professor Rose-
Ackerman. The second will focus on government investigations into 
corruption, and will be led by Mr. Treanor, Mr. Brez, and Mr. Cohn. 
Professor Griffith, I turn the floor over to you. 
SEAN GRIFFITH: Wonderful. Thank you all for being here. 
Thanks, Giselle, for organizing this. I was delighted when Giselle said, “I 
am thinking about topics for the Corporate Journal’s symposium and 
maybe I will do something about corruption and foreign anti-corruption 
laws,” and I said, “Perfect topic, Giselle, because I have a working paper 
on the very subject and you can invite me to present it and I will.”10 And 
so, here I am. Thank you, Giselle, for choosing such a convenient topic, 
from my own self-interest. 
My presentation, in a way, is about self-interest. It is about the self-
interest of the regulated entity, which is to say U.S. business interests, in 
the promotion and promulgation of foreign anti-corruption laws. 
What I would like to do in my presentation is to assert my ivory-
tower prerogative and step back from the details and ask the larger 
question of how anti-corruption regulation came to exist at all and, in 
particular, how it came to exist considering that it is directly contrary to 
the interests of one of the strongest in-state lobbies in the United States—
namely, the business community. 
My working paper is with my friend and colleague, Tom Lee, who 
is on the faculty here. He wishes he could be here today, but he is traveling 
around the world, speaking on a different issue. 
We are talking about foreign anti-corruption laws. It is not a tricky 
political economy-story to tell, to explain why a state might enact 
domestic anti-corruption laws—in other words, laws against the payment 
and receipt of bribes to officials inside its own borders. Obviously, that is 
in the state’s interest because corruption has all kinds of negative effects 
on the country in which it occurs, which is to say that it leads to the 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Ruiz, supra note 5. 
 10. Sean J. Griffith & Thomas H. Lee, The Political Economy of Foreign Anti-
Corruption Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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misallocation of resources and the disenfranchisement of the poor. Any 
government that is interested in promoting the benefit of its own people 
would have an obvious interest in enacting laws against in-state domestic 
corruption. 
What is interesting about foreign anti-corruption laws is that they are 
laws about state actors from one country—corporate actors, say, from the 
United States—whose bribe is paid elsewhere. This ought to strike us as 
a little bit odd. It certainly strikes me as odd. While the United States 
clearly has an interest in protecting the U.S. political system, it is not so 
obvious what the U.S. interest is in guaranteeing the functioning of 
political systems in other states. Why should the United States care 
whether corruption is rampant in other places? 
It is particularly odd that the United States was the first and, for a 
time, only country to pass a law against foreign bribery and corruption. 
What that meant was that U.S. companies—for example, Exxon—could 
not bribe or make certain in bidding against their foreign rivals—like 
British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell—to win oil concessions in 
different states where corruption was maybe necessary to get that 
concession and where the foreign rivals were not similarly regulated. 
A U.S. company that follows U.S domestic law would be at a 
competitive disadvantage to a foreign competitor. In fact, this was the 
case—or at least the business lobby asserted that this was the case—for 
many years after the passage of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(“FCPA”).11 What we want to do in this paper is to look at that problem 
and try to assess how foreign anti-bribery laws came to be: not only how 
they came to be in one state, the United States, but how they have now 
been passed or promulgated all around the world. 
Now, we are not the first people who have ever looked at this or 
talked about the origins of the FCPA or other foreign corruption statutes. 
We categorize the prior literature in this area as focusing on rights-based 
accounts or realist accounts. 
Under the rights-based account, there is an altruistic state actor who 
does not want there to be corruption, for humanitarian or similar reasons, 
and who works alongside international development goals of preventing 
corruption all around the world, and thus seeks to promulgate that 
international human right, if you will, from state to state. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff 
(2012). 
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We think that corruption is bad, but we find those accounts very 
difficult to believe because there is a collective action problem there. The 
freedom from corruption is like a public good. The trouble with public 
goods is that they do not come about by magic on their own because every 
actor, every person, who would be regulated by the rule that is necessary 
to create the public good has an incentive to defect. So, you have a 
collective action problem. 
The United States passes the FCPA. That is terrific for French 
companies. Maybe the French government does not like corruption either, 
but the French government is going to have an incentive to defect and 
allow its companies to continue to pay bribes. We find that to be the basic 
problem with rights-based accounts. 
Realist accounts will be just the opposite of the human rights story, 
which is basically that this is in somebody’s economic interest. Maybe it 
is really good for corporations not to have to pay bribes; maybe it saves 
them a lot of money, so it is actually in the corporate interest or, 
alternatively, it is in the enforcement authority’s interest. 
That is the starting point for us: in whose interest is all this? 
A pretty good example that we used to try to poke at some of these 
realist stories is the Chiquita Banana example. It was one of the 
motivating stories for FCPA originally. 
This involved a bribe that was paid by the predecessor entity of 
Chiquita Banana, United Brands, in order to avoid an export tax in the 
state of Honduras. 12 The tax that was going to be assessed against the 
banana company was $7.5 million. The bribe that Chiquita Banana had to 
pay in order to avoid the tax was $2.5 million. So, it is pretty clear that 
this is a positive net present value transaction—spend $2.5 million to get 
a $7.5 million gain. 
From the company’s perspective, bribery can be efficient, which 
should not be shocking to anyone. So, it is just hard to believe that passing 
a rule against bribery is somehow in the corporate interest, at least in the 
short term. 
Now, who lost? What happens from the Honduran side? Well, the 
president got a $2.5 million bribe but the treasury lost out on collecting 
the $7.5 million tax. If that tax had come into the treasury, the treasury 
would have distributed it to serve the people of Honduras. That did not 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Associated Press, United Brands Bribe Is Laid to Honduran, N.Y. TIMES (May 
16, 1975), http://www.nytimes.com/1975/05/16/archives/united-brands-bribe-linked-to-
honduran-honduran-official-named-in.html [https://perma.cc/XV4T-PBP9]. 
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happen; instead, the president of Honduras bought a private jet, or 
whatever he did. He was subsequently overthrown, by the way, by 
Communist revolutionaries, and that is going to be part of our story. 
Who else’s interest might be affected by the enforcement of foreign 
anti-bribery laws? One other answer is the enforcement authorities, and 
there is some support for that claim. 
Figure 1: World Bank Report13 
This is a graph from a World Bank report from a couple of years ago 
showing where the money goes in the enforcement of foreign anti-bribery 
laws. This is in a situation where the enforcing country is different from 
the country in which the bribe is paid. 
What happens to the money that is taken as a fine in those 
enforcement actions? The answer is it goes to the enforcement country; it 
goes to the Department of Justice or the U.S. Treasury. It does not go back 
to Honduras or to some nongovernmental organization that will distribute 
the money to the benefit of the people of Honduras who were originally 
deprived of tax revenue as a result of the bribe. It stays in the U.S. 
Treasury. That is part of the story. We are not as cynical as this, but we 
acknowledge it. 
The fundamental moving part in our story is the U.S. business 
interest. How can it be that the U.S. business interest, the most powerful 
lobby in the United States, allowed the FCPA, a statute that is directly 
contrary to the business community’s interests, to be passed? 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Griffith & Lee, supra note 10. 
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Our answer is foreign policy. This is not an answer that is original to 
us. In 1977, with the enactment of the FCPA, we were in the middle of 
the Cold War. A number of corporate executives were parading through 
Congress in connection with the Watergate scandal, talking about slush 
funds that they used in domestic bribes—“And, oh yeah, by the way, we 
pay foreign bribes with those slush funds too.” “How much?” “Well, we 
are not divulging it on our accounting statements.” So, that is already 
accounting fraud. 
When the Securities and Exchange Commission wanted to go after 
companies for these bribes, it just wanted to focus on the accounting 
issues. But Congress got in the act and made it about something else. 
There are a lot of statements in the Congressional Record that show that 
Congress wanted a substantive prohibition of bribery, not just a bunch of 
accounting provisions that say you will fully and fairly reflect the 
disposition of firm assets. Why? For optical reasons, for reasons relating 
to the Cold War. 
Communist revolutionaries around the world were capitalizing on 
the idea that the capitalist economies were corrupt. They had a number of 
pretty good examples: one of them was in Honduras; one of them was in 
Japan; one of them was in Italy; one of them involved the Lockheed 
Corporation paying bribes to foreign governments. A number of 
governments fell as a result of this: the Japanese government fell; the 
Honduran government fell; Italy was in trouble. 
The idea was that we needed to draw a line against our Communist 
adversaries by showing that we are really not that dirty. So, we passed the 
FCPA. Argument number one in our story is that foreign policy trumps 
the U.S. business lobby—but not for long. The U.S. business lobby comes 
back. It is very resilient. 
The first best thing for the U.S. business lobby would be a repeal of 
the statute, but that was not going to happen. It would be bad optics in the 
ongoing Cold War. The second best thing would be for the statute to not 
be enforced—and that is what they got. There is a period of very lax 
enforcement of the FCPA for the first twenty, twenty-five years of its 
existence. 
The argument of the business lobby at this time was: “We need a 
level playing field against our competitors in foreign states who can 
continue to pay bribes to foreign leaders. It is not like the foreign leaders 
stopped accepting bribes just because we cannot pay. But now we, Exxon, 
cannot pay the bribe and someone else wins the contract. And that is bad 
for us, that is bad for the U.S. economy, that is bad for U.S. business. So, 
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we would rather you did not enforce these laws. But if they have to be 
enforced, we want them to be enforced on the competitors too.” 
The U.S. government starts going through multinational, multilateral 
initiatives to get the other big hegemonic power—Europe—to agree to 
some kind of foreign bribery rules through the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”). It takes a long time. The U.S. 
government first proposed them in the early 1990s. It did not get them 
until 1997-1998 with the enactment of the OECD Convention.14 
In connection with the enactment of the Convention, the U.S. amends 
the FCPA to give the Department of Justice long-arm jurisdiction: so, 
jurisdiction not just against U.S. incorporated or domiciled businesses but 
also against businesses that have contacts in the United States.15 
The “contacts” part of the statute, when it is eventually enforced, 
winds up getting enforced very aggressively. “Contacts” include contact 
through a U.S. bank—in other words, the use of the U.S. dollar in a bribe. 
Regardless of whether the bribe is from a foreign company, paid in a 
foreign country to a foreign dictator, if there is a use of U.S. dollars in that 
transaction, that is enough for U.S enforcement authorities to go after that 
transaction due to its contact with the United States. 
That amendment to the statute does not take effect until the OECD 
Convention is enacted, and that gives the U.S enforcement authorities a 
very strong jurisdictional hook to go against foreign actors in the event 
that, as indeed occurred, the OECD Treaty is not enforced evenly among 
all of its signatories. 
Enforcement is still pretty lax at this time. That is a good state of 
affairs for U.S. businesses. Now U.S businesses can say: “Look, we live 
under the same statutory rule that our foreign competitors do, at least in 
European jurisdictions. We are both barred from committing bribes. But 
there is not a lot of enforcement, so whatever happens, happens.” 
The next big shock to the system, Tom and I want to argue, is another 
foreign policy shock: the war on terror. After 2001, the government starts 
going after terrorists’ finances. When they go after terrorists’ finances 
they try to figure out, “Where did the money come from to pay for these 
terrorist operations?” 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
Dec. 17, 1997, 112 Stat. 3302, 37 I.L.M. 1. 
 15. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-
1-3, 78ff (2012). 
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The first thing they discover is money laundering, so this is when 
anti-money-laundering rules explode. The second thing they discover is a 
lot of foreign corrupt payments in connection with the money laundering. 
At some point after that “eureka” moment, enforcement begins in 
earnest. This is now the mid-2000s. At this time, when enforcement 
finally begins under the FCPA, it does not begin just against the U.S 
companies, but U.S. enforcement authorities use their jurisdictional hook 
against foreign companies—i.e., U.S. businesses’ foreign competitors. 
There is some international relations (“IR”) theory in the paper, which I 
am not going to bother you with right now. But I will show you that in 
two slides. 
Figure 2: FCPA Statistics16 
This is a slide from Steve Choi and Kevin Davis at New York 
University, who look at how often the FCPA is enforced against foreign 
companies and against domestic companies. What they find is basically 
two-thirds of enforcement actions are against U.S. companies. 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Griffith & Lee, supra note 10. 
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Figure 3: FCPA Largest Settlements17 
But then, if you look at another chart, which shows the ten largest FCPA 
settlements, you get a different picture. Only two of them are against U.S. 
companies; the other eight are against foreign companies. 
So, what we want to argue is that this is evidence of the U.S. 
enforcement authorities actively trying to level the playing field for U.S. 
business interests; that one part of understanding how this regime is 
spread around the world is understanding the interest of the domestic-
regulated party and the way in which its interests have—and I do not want 
to say “captured” in the strict sense—but rather influenced the incentives 
of the regulators and enforcers of this particular set of rules. 
Now, a theory is only as good as its predictions, so we have some. If 
our theoretical account of how foreign anti-bribery laws and norms have 
been transmitted is true, we should be able to make a couple of 
predictions. 
Here is one: once foreign companies with U.S. contacts—that is, 
foreign companies with realistic U.S. risk—become realistic enforcement 
targets, they will have an interest in leveling the playing field too. Now, 
who do they want to level the playing field against? Their competitors 
who have a lesser chance of being enforced against by U.S. regulators. 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. 
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So, if you are a big French company and you are at risk of being enforced 
against by the U.S. Department of Justice, but you have French and 
European competitors that do not face the same risk, well, you, the big 
French company, want a statutory regime in France or in Europe that is 
enforced against your domestic or regional competitors in order to level 
the playing field against them.18 In other words, it is not just U.S. business 
interests that want to level the playing field. Once enforcement risk is 
global, foreign businesses will want to level the playing field too. 
Another of our predictions is that leveling the playing field against 
domestic or regional competitors with fewer contacts means more foreign 
corruption legislation and enforcement, which means more regional 
treaties and more regional enforcement. 
And we are starting to see that, right? After a big enforcement action 
against British Aerospace,19 we got the U.K. Bribery Act.20 And France 
and Korea, which have lagged in terms of enforcement under foreign anti-
bribery laws, have started to enforce these laws, and to pass new 
legislation in the case of France, which might make a difference.21 
Another prediction, which is an application of IR theory, is that once 
a big no-bribe coalition has formed, awarding contracts to bribing firms 
is more difficult from the perspective of the corrupt foreign government. 
That might be for two reasons: one, it is harder to conceal the fact that 
you are taking bribes. Assuming that the government is not corrupt all the 
way to the top and we are just talking about one corrupt official, that 
governmental official will have a harder time justifying to its superiors 
why it took a contract from company X but excluded the British, 
American, German, and Swiss companies that were also bidding. “Why 
was this the best bid?” “Well, it was from a company that was willing to 
pay the bribe,” is probably not a good answer. 
It is also possible that companies from countries that remain free to 
bribe might have a real or perceived quality differential in comparison 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Jonathan Webb, France Tightens Anti-Corruption Laws, FORBES (Mar. 31, 
2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jwebb/2016/03/31/france-tightens-anti-corruption-
laws/#3faed26e2a55 [https://perma.cc/9WNQ-PFT3]. 
 19. Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark, BAE Settles Corruption Charges, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/business/global/06bribe.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/7LVM-FUQP]. 
 20. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.). 
 21. Choe Sang-Hun, Antigraft Law Stirs up Wariness over South Koreans Bearing 
Gifts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/world/asia/sou 
th-korea-bribery-law.html [https://perma.cc/QFZ8-WMKH]; Webb, supra note 18. 
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with companies that are precluded from bribing as a result of foreign anti-
bribery laws. 
So our theory enables us to make some predictions. 
But there is one problem—a big problem—with our thesis, and that 
involves China. China is sort of an equal now to the U.S. in terms of global 
economic power and reach, and China is one of the countries where 
companies engage in bribery. So, it is a problem for our thesis that this 
might be a counter-hegemon. The “invisible hand story” that we are trying 
to tell might not work with this counter-hegemon. If Chinese companies 
continue to bribe, that may be a sufficient counterweight to our story. 
But who knows how that is going to go? As you may know, there is 
a big domestic corruption crackdown going on in China.22 And, just as the 
FCPA began with a domestic corruption crackdown in the U.S., it is 
possible that the Chinese government will not be willing to allow its 
companies to bribe in the same way that they have previously. 
That is our story about the political economy of the foreign anti-
bribery laws. I appreciate your comments at any time. Thanks. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thanks. 
Next, Professor Rose-Ackerman will be speaking. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: Today I will focus on “grand 
corruption” in procurement, privatization, and concessions—in other 
words, corrupt deals that may lead to prosecutions under the U.S. FCPA 
and in other countries that have signed the OECD Convention. 
It is important to understand that not only do large amounts of money 
change hands in such corrupt deals, but also corruption affects the 
behavior both of public officials who select the winning firms and of the 
firms that carry out the contracts. 
First, the cost of such corruption is not just a waste of public 
money—arising from the excess cost of corrupt projects and a distorted 
distribution of benefits. There are behavioral effects as well. What 
happens when top officials are willing to be corrupt? First, they might 
choose projects that are simply too big—not simply white elephants, but 
very big white elephants, larger than they should be—because if bribes 
are a proportion of the size of the elephant, a corrupt official will want to 
have big projects. Second, officials and firms may prefer projects where 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Tim Daiss, China Turns up Heat on Corruption: ‘No Mercy Against Law 
Breakers’, FORBES (Aug. 28, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/08/28/ 
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they can easily hide bribes. These would be one-of-a-kind projects with 
lots of special bells and whistles, projects where an outsider cannot say, 
“Oh, there must be some bribes hidden in there.” Hence, officials will tilt 
their decisions toward projects and purchases that are too big and too 
fancy. 
But what about investors who are thinking about engaging in 
corruption? Bribes are costs for firms. They estimate how small a bribe 
they can get away with and still get the contract. However, corruptly 
obtained contracts have special uncertainties. The government may 
change, and a new set of politicians may take power that either cracks 
down on corruption or, at least, creates uncertainly for existing 
contractors who are vulnerable to blackmail. 
Facing those uncertainties, firms might choose an investment 
strategy that makes it possible for them to walk away from their 
investment at minimum cost. My favorite real-world examples are gas-
fired power plants that are built on ships. Why would a firm want to use 
this expensive option? Essentially, it makes exit feasible. The contractor 
ties up the ship at a port in the host country, and if the country’s officials 
try to extort funds from the investor ex post, the firm simply unties the 
ship and leaves with the investment. 
In general, a contractor who has paid a bribe is less likely to invest 
in fixed capital that cannot be moved away when there is a change in the 
government or a change in the political situation. So, investors may want 
to try to get their money out quickly and to design projects with a shorter 
payback period than would be profitable in an honest environment. 
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Figure 4: Procurement Process23 
Figure 4 illustrates the various ways that corruption can influence the 
procurement.24 The opportunities go beyond the bidding process itself. 
Payoffs can occur up-front in the early stages when the country is 
deciding what it wants to buy. For example, article businesses in Nigeria 
are reported to collaborate among themselves and suggest projects that 
these businesses were particularly able to provide and where bribes could 
be hidden.25 Corruption can enter when identifying and designing the 
projects so that the rest of the process looks perfectly honest with a 
seemingly spotless sealed bidding process. The process is corrupted at the 
very beginning in a way that favors certain contractors. 
A good example of such corruption involved the purchase of 
telephones in an African country in which the procurement specification 
required that the telephones had to be able to survive at below-zero 
Centigrade temperatures. This is a ridiculous constraint in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Only one telephone company, based in Scandinavia, made 
telephones that would survive in such cold weather. So the fix can be in 
at an early stage. 
The second set of corrupt opportunities arises during the pre-bid 
period in which the state decides who is pre-qualified to make bids. Third, 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Reproduced from Susan Rose-Ackerman & Bonnie J. Palifka, Corruption and 
Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform 104 (2d ed. 2016). 
 24. For more elaboration of these points, see Glenn T. Ware, Shaun Moss, J. Edgardo 
Campos & Gregory Noone, Corruption in Procurement; A Perennial Challenge, in The 
Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level 295 (J. Edgardo 
Campos and Sanjay Pradhan eds., 2007). 
 25. Nnaoke Ufere, Sheri Perelli, Richard Boland & Bo Carlsson, Merchants of 
Corruption: How Entrepreneurs Manufacture and Supply Bribes, 40 WORLD DEV. 2440 
(2012). 
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a nominally acceptable sealed-bidding process can be corrupted by the 
illicit sharing of information with contractors. 
Finally, post-bid, after the project goes into effect, it is common for 
there to be opportunities for renegotiation. If the whole system is 
undermined by corruption, officials come back after the contract has been 
signed and demand additional bribes for engaging in contract 
renegotiations. Conversely, the contracting firm may demand certain 
extra benefits and make payoffs in return. 
Figure 5: Cost Overruns26 
Renegotiations lead to cost overruns on big projects, with or without 
outright payoffs. Figure 5 provides some recent example, including 
several U.S. cases. For example, Boston’s “Big Dig,” cost 5.21 times 
more than the original estimate. This is not to say that all these projects 
were corrupt, but they do raise red flags. 
Flyvbjerg and Molloy ask an interesting question: How do cost 
overruns happen? Doesn’t everybody know ex ante that the estimates are 
too low?27 Why does anyone believe the cost estimates? If the estimates 
were indeed realistic, then cost overruns would more clearly signal 
corruption and could prompt investigations. 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, supra note 23, at 98 which cites the background 
sources. 
 27. Bent Flyvbjerg & Eamonn Molloy, Delusion, Deception and Corruption in 
Major Infrastructure Projects: Causes, Consequences, and Cures, in International 
Handbook on the Economics of Corruption 81 (Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Søreide, 
eds., 2011). 
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The authors’ answer is as follows. They posit that within government 
construction agencies there is competition among engineers, architects, 
and developers about which project to pick. One way to win support for 
“your project” is to tell your superiors, “Look, this is going to be really 
cheap, and it is going to be a terrific project.” To win the competition for 
projects, each advocate has an incentive to underestimate costs. Hence, in 
an honest bureaucracy with no corruption, groups compete to get “their” 
projects approved and have a built-in tendency to underestimate the costs. 
This state of affairs then provides an opening for people who want to 
benefit through corruption. 
Now, consider the related case of concessions that permit investors 
to exploit natural resources, for example, timber or minerals. Here too, 
bribes not only personally enrich officials but also distort economic 
choices. Those who pay kickbacks have an incentive to work quickly. 
They may, for example, cut down trees before they reach an optimal size 
because the government might change, or investigators might uncover the 
corruption. The investor has a shorter time horizon than in an honest 
polity. 
Trees grow a little bit every year, and they increase in value just 
sitting in the forest. But they are also valuable cut down and sold. So, 
timber investors must make a trade-off: do they let them grow for another 
year or do they cut them down right away? My claim is that a firm that 
corruptly obtains a concession will be likely to speed up its tree cutting 
because it is in an uncertain environment that has been created by 
corruption. Corruption creates uncertainty for investors, over and above 
the ordinary uncertainty of a market. 
Similar issues arise in privatization contracts where major state-
owned assets are transferred to private hands. Suppose a firm wants to bid 
on a state electric company. The investor wants to purchase it as cheaply 
as possible and may be willing to bribe the public officials to value it at a 
relatively low level and obtain inside information showing a higher value. 
Then, after buying the private firm, the private owner may bribe the 
regulators so that they do not impose too many costly constraints. The 
government treasury does not get the funds that it should have received 
for selling off its assets, and the actual operation of the firm is distorted. 
Even without corruption, a country that is privatizing a public utility 
faces a trade-off between selling it at the highest price or creating a 
competitive private market. If the government prioritizes its own revenue 
it will want to sell the public firm as a monopoly, because that will 
maximize its value to the private investor. But the resulting monopoly 
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imposes a social cost. Even with no corruption a government may opt for 
the monopoly option, but with corruption it gets the worst of both 
worlds—fewer funds for the government budget and no competition.   
I want to end by thinking more generally about the obligations of 
multinational firms and of the professionals who work on infrastructure 
projects and other large deals. Do multinational firms have an obligation 
not to pay bribes, or ought they to simply worry about getting caught? 
Should professionals blow the whistle if they observe illicit behavior by 
those who use their services? 
First consider the professionals. I advised a commission that was 
investigating corruption in Quebec involving multiple infrastructure 
contracts over several decades. What puzzled me was why the 
professionals involved—lawyers, accountants, and architects—had not 
blown the whistle years earlier. Even if most avoided direct involvement, 
they must have had some sense of what was going on. They were 
benefiting from the underlying corrupt arrangements, but that hardly 
justifies their silence. To me, the norms of these professions ought to 
include obligations to report on suspected corruption and fraud. 
Second, I believe that corporations have moral obligations, 
particularly with respect to corruption. The corporation is a creature of 
law; it is only allowed to exist because laws permit it to exist and permit 
it to operate. The state allows firms to operate, presumably because the 
corporate form is a broadly beneficial way of operating in the market. 
Therefore, corporations have an obligation to act in ways that further the 
efficiency of the market—and that applies to corruption, not just to 
monopolization. They should also act in ways that do not undermine the 
political legitimacy of the countries that are permitting them to operate. 
One can argue about how far that obligation goes and what it implies. But 
to me, corporations have a moral obligation to refrain from corruption, 
both with respect to upholding the efficiency of the market and to 
supporting the political legitimacy of the political countries where they 
operate. 
There is, of course, controversy about the extent to which ethical 
behavior is good for the bottom line. I am glad that ethical behavior is 
often also profitable, but I am a little less proud of a company whose 
ethical actions makes its profits higher. The corporations that should get 
the most praise for their behavior are those that act in ways that further 
ethical concerns arising from their international role but that cannot be 
explained as profit-maximizing for the individual firm. 
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GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Professor Griffith and Professor 
Rose-Ackerman, for your theories and insights on corruption. Now we 
are going to move on to questions and answers. But first we are going to 
reserve that space for our three panelists to perhaps share some of their 
experiences or insights or counterarguments to what Professor Griffith 
and Professor Rose-Ackerman just presented. 
Mr. Treanor, do you have any remarks that you would like to share 
with the audience? 
TIMOTHY TREANOR: Sure. I have been practicing in the area of 
anti-corruption enforcement—the FCPA in particular—for the last ten 
years or so and my experiences have caused me to think a lot about some 
of the topics that Professor Griffith has raised in his initial presentation. 
The work that he is doing is very important: looking at the economic 
motivations for anti-corruption enforcement. Those who practice in this 
area, like myself, constantly evaluate whether anti-corruption 
enforcement is going to increase or decrease because there are so many 
different factors at play that could change the way enforcement is 
handled. There are, for example, a variety of political and economic 
factors that influence whether we as a society push more aggressively to 
enforce anti-corruption laws or we pull back and push less aggressively. 
There is a very healthy debate amongst practitioners and academics about 
the proper role for anti-corruption enforcement. I think Professor Griffith 
proposes to add something quite valuable to that discussion. 
I personally have not thought that the genesis of the FCPA, while 
very interesting, was all that controversial. I was only about ten years old 
when the FCPA was passed, so it is not like I consciously lived through 
those events, but I have always viewed the FCPA as product of the 
confluence of the Cold War and Watergate. We had a situation where our 
country was, to a significant degree, in crisis and some private 
corporations were seen to be deepening that crisis by paying bribes and 
in the process meddling in foreign affairs, which is traditionally the 
purview of the federal government. 
The Church Committee—the Senate committee that most closely 
examined the FCPA and its potential impact—found that, where bribes 
were paid to foreign government officials, we as a nation were damned 
no matter who was being bribed. If our companies were supporting the 
“right” political parties in certain countries, the opponents—if they were 
able to expose the bribes—could gain an advantage by proving that the 
U.S. was meddling. The Marxist movement got a lot of mileage out of 
portraying the U.S. and U.S. corporations as corrupting foreign 
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governments. So, fueling those accusations was not good. And, certainly, 
where our companies were supporting governments that our government 
did not support, that was a whole different problem. 
There were of course political motivations behind passing an anti-
corruption statute. Originally, the FCPA only addressed U.S. domestic 
concerns and the issuers of securities in the U.S. So, it was very much 
focused on U.S. entities. As a result, it was not of particular concern to 
foreign nations. And then, of course, there was Watergate as a factor—
not only did the Watergate investigation have a role in uncovering some 
of the improper corporate payments that were made, but public reaction 
to the events of Watergate inspired a greater sense of morality in this 
country: “We need to be a country that stands for the right things. We 
cannot support this kind of conduct. We should be a leader in the world 
for doing what is right.” That really gave momentum to the birth of the 
FCPA. So, I think in a different time that statute might never have come 
into existence, but the result is that we have it now, although it did sit 
dormant for a number of years. 
My view, in considering how little the FCPA was utilized before 
2001 relative to later years, is that there was an increased sense of 
awareness after 9/11 of our role internationally and even more sensitivity 
to what we could do to police improper conduct worldwide. The world 
saw numerous examples of corrupt unfriendly foreign regimes—like the 
Gaddafi government in Libya—that were being propped up by improper 
payments which provided good reasons for pursuing enforcement of the 
FCPA in certain contexts. But enforcement went way beyond seeking to 
prevent acts that had the potential to corrupt entire foreign governments. 
And having lived through some of that, I feel like what happened is that 
we had a somewhat dormant statute that was rediscovered by prosecutors 
who believed in the value of pursuing provable cases of corruption no 
matter how big or small the corrupt effect. And during the early 2000s, 
there were certain enforcement actions against foreign companies that 
were so egregious that there was not much of an argument about whether 
there should be enforcement. 
There had been changes to the FCPA in 1998 that allowed our 
government to go after foreign entities if their conduct had some touch 
point in the U.S. If a corruption-related payment passed through the 
U.S.—in the government’s view, even perhaps an email through the 
U.S.—a basis for enforcement would exist, and of course at least 
domestically, it was more politically palatable for us to chase around 
foreign entities that were doing bad things in the world. 
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I also believe that, during the years that I was in the Department of 
Justice, the DoJ learned how to hold corporations accountable much more 
effectively. Previously, there had been prosecutions of corporations but 
typically the corporations were indicted and those cases were more 
conventionally followed through to the end; maybe there would be a 
guilty plea but the types of dispositions were limited. The DoJ in the 
2000s learned how to use tools like deferred prosecution agreements and 
non-prosecution agreements to exact from companies fines and 
compliance control concessions and in some cases to put monitors in 
place. The Department was able to get a hold of businesses and force 
change from a compliance perspective. 
That was sort of a hybrid of my understanding of some of the history 
of the FCPA, together with my personal experiences in that area. And, I 
am glad to see that Professor Griffith is looking at these issues. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Mr. Treanor. 
Mr. Cohn, would you like to offer some of your insights as a leader 
of an in-house compliance department? 
MICHAEL COHN: Sure. Hi there. Not to pick on Professor Griffith, 
but he had mentioned that he was approaching some of the stuff from an 
ivory tower. I think that was maybe a little too pejorative. I think what he 
said was actually pretty interesting. But I will say that I cannot even spend 
time in the lobby of the ivory tower. I deal with FCPA from a very 
different point of view from either of the professors and, in many ways, 
even the practitioners that are up here because I have to grapple with these 
issues on a day-to-day basis in a fundamental blocking and tackling sort 
of way. 
I believe the FCPA—tying in to some of the themes that the 
professors just discussed—does have a real impact on business that I 
actually find in some ways to be negative. For example, people who are 
operating in a business in various countries around the world—and I 
worked with Zach here on a number of things in the past— operate in fear 
of regulatory or criminal prosecution for doing things that may have 
perfectly legitimate, non-corrupt purposes, such as providing meals, 
traveling from one place to another in a common vehicle, or other 
commonplace business-related entertainment. 
There is a general fear that I have, which I think is very common 
among people in my position, that those kinds of things can, even as small 
isolated instances, get you into the crosshairs of regulators who are very 
anxious to make a case or make a name for themselves in some manner. 
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And it does, I think, put an unreasonable burden on business. 
Certainly, some of the cases we have discussed have been very serious, 
significant cases with outright corrupt actors engaging in what can only 
be described as bribery. But there are also lots of cases that are maybe 
more—since we are in a law school, I will say this—in the penumbra of 
the FCPA but are probably not really what the FCPA is after. I have not 
really given a lot of thought to how one might solve that. Instead, I spend 
most of my time just thinking about how to avoid it. It does really impinge 
on a small level, but probably cumulatively on a macro level, on normal 
business interactions throughout the business world, which are impacted 
in a way that does not serve the purposes of the FCPA 
From a compliance-program perspective, it is very hard to monitor 
because you have, especially as your organization gets larger and larger, 
lots of people who are walking around carrying a business card and a 
credit card from your company who can do things that probably do not 
qualify as outright bribery but nevertheless can get them and your 
organization into serious trouble. 
Like many compliance issues, keeping up with that starts with who 
you hire. There are all sorts of techniques people use in terms of 
monitoring employee expenses and communications, and of course there 
is always training. But the topic of how to prevent and detect problematic 
behavior is something that people who are in the compliance business 
spend a lot of time thinking about. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Mr. Cohn. 
Mr. Brez? 
ZACHARY BREZ: Sure. I have got a couple of things to say when 
I stand up. I have two quick thoughts. I thought both of your presentations 
were great. I will tell you that last year I probably spent 150 nights 
overseas, and the number one question I got about the FCPA is: “Why 
does America care? What do you care what bribes are paid in Brazil?” 
And I used to have a stock answer that was something like: “America has 
this view that it does not like to think that it lives in a world where it 
permits its citizens to do bad things.” 
There are a host of laws that fit that scenario: it is illegal to leave the 
country with the specific intent of sexually abusing a child;28 it is illegal 
to not wear a helmet on a motorcycle in a number of states,29 and people 
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who supported that are people who do not themselves ride motorcycles, 
right? So, we have a paternalistic view about our own set of laws, and I 
used to think that Americans did not want to live in a country where its 
businesses were paying bribes overseas. 
I tend to think that is not actually true. I think, more realistically, it 
is a playing field leveler for U.S. companies against their own U.S. 
competitors, i.e., if you a very large multinational conglomerate and you 
are sure that your corporate style is never to pay bribes—and, believe me, 
every client I have is sure that they are never going to pay bribes—then 
you want to make sure that your U.S. competitors, in the first instance, 
are playing by those same set of rules. Before you even get to the 
foreigners, you want to ensure that your U.S. competitors, whom you 
realistically view as your biggest threats, are playing by those same set of 
rules. 
Now, frequently, it turns out they are all wrong because it is rare that 
it is a huge corporate scheme. It is more often about the individual 
people—the salesman who has to make his targets that month and the 
manager who is going to make his targets. 
I tend to think that also relates to the enforcement piece here. Tim 
was talking about the change in the late 1990s and early 2000s. I actually 
think a lot of that is because of Mark Mendelsohn. He was an individual 
in the U.S. government who saw a set of laws that had not been used in 
prosecution in a while, and he did not have a very glamorous job, and he 
decided that he was going to make that a glamorous job. And if you really 
are a cynic like me, you say that maybe it led to the prosecution of foreign 
companies over U.S. companies because he realized when he left and 
went into private practice that his clients were going to be those same U.S. 
companies and he would not want them to hold a grudge against him. 
Maybe, maybe not. 
On the issue raised about moral companies—I have spent a lot of 
time thinking about this—I am of the view that altruism is not a reality in 
humans. It is hard to imagine that if humans are not altruistic, their 
companies and corporations that are expressions of their views would be 
altruistic. I think altruism is a lie and people do good things because they 
want to feel good about themselves. So, it is not altruistic if you are doing 
it to feel better. 
MICHAEL COHN: And on that thought, the sun suddenly shines in. 
ZACHARY BREZ: Exactly, right. I think that on some level, though, 
companies think about it the same way. Is Apple really against the use of 
conflict minerals because conflict minerals are terrible, or do they know 
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that if a law gets passed that requires companies to dispose of conflict 
minerals it is really going to screw their competitors who have been using 
them and who will have to find a new version of their supply chain? So 
maybe it is altruistic; maybe it is also just attempting to position yourself 
for better profits. I would love it if their version was that it was altruistic, 
but the cynic in me thinks it is probably not. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Mr. Brez. 
I am going to allow Professor Griffith and Professor Rose-Ackerman 
to respond to what was just said, and then we may have to reserve the rest 
of the time for the audience questions and answers at the end of the second 
panel. Professor Griffith? 
SEAN GRIFFITH: My only response is thank you for your remarks. 
I appreciate that very much. 
I actually have a question, if I can ask, for Professor Rose-Ackerman. 
I was very interested in your presentation, especially when you mentioned 
at the end that you primarily see yourself as an economist. As you were 
going through your presentation, I was jotting down things that might be 
testable. Here is my partial list, and I wonder if there is any literature or 
if you agree that these would be things that might be testable from the 
story that you were telling. 
One, I wonder if we could correlate cost overruns with other kinds 
of indicia of corruption. The other thing that you were saying was that 
there is an instability risk associated with winning a contract where 
corruption is involved. And so, I was wondering if there are ways of 
mitigating that instability risk. One thing I thought of was political risk 
insurance. So, I wonder if we could correlate political risk insurance with 
other indicia of corruption. The other one is about the trees; I mean, the 
trees were an obvious one. I am assuming that there is a study that 
correlates the age of trees that are cut down, that are younger, with other 
indicia of corruption. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: There is plenty of empirical work on 
corruption. But, of course, it is a topic that, in principle, is hard to 
research. 
I have just published a second edition of my Corruption and 
Government book with a co-author who teaches in Mexico [Bonnie J. 
Palifka] and who convinced me to include more information about 
organized crime and money laundering in the new edition.30 We also cite 
much of the empirical work in the field. 
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528 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
One valuable study would consider the way in which political risk 
insurance premiums are calculated around the world. One could easily 
combine that data with the cross-country indices of levels of corruption 
from Transparency International or from the World Bank Institute. Of 
course, there is some circularity, because those indices are based on 
perceptions. But I think the indices capture something about the 
pathologies of the relationship between citizens and the state, and between 
business and the state. 
As for the timber industry, there is research on countries, such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia, that have very important forestry industries that 
operate both inside and outside the country, and on the relationship 
between their behavior and the high level of corruption in those countries. 
It would be valuable to study timber harvests in corrupt and more honest 
countries, but as far as I know, that work still needs to be done. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Professor Rose-Ackerman. 
We actually do have time for a couple of questions from the 
audience. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Ian Engoron. I am on the Corporate 
& Financial Law Journal. This question is for Professor Griffith. You 
spoke about other countries trying to level the playing field against 
regional competitors when passing their own version of the FCPA. I was 
just curious if you think that it might, in the end, come back to hurt the 
U.S. companies when they try to level the playing field against us instead 
of their regional competitors, say, within the United Kingdom or France. 
SEAN GRIFFITH: Interesting question. The question with all of 
these “level playing field” stories is how serious the enforcement risk is. 
U.S. enforcement risk is very serious for U.S. companies already. So, it 
would be hard for me to imagine a U.S. company worrying that there was 
a greater enforcement risk as a result of a French statute. It will certainly 
have to do different things from a compliance perspective, but I do not 
think that its enforcement risk could go up. And if it does not go up, then 
it is not a business disadvantage. But it might have other kinds of 
compliance cost disadvantages. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: One of the arguments against the 
FCPA is that American companies lose business. First of all, even if they 
do sometimes lose business, the losses are often exaggerated. If a firm 
loses one contract in a corrupt country, it makes an effort to shift its 
business to countries that are less corrupt. The opportunity cost for the 
firm is not value of the whole lost contract; it is just the marginal 
difference between one contract and the other. 
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Second, if we consider the U.S. national interest, products that enter 
the global market, such as minerals and commodities, are going to be 
available to U.S. consumers and businesses no matter whether or not a 
U.S. company gets the contract. So, the harm for the U.S. is only the 
possible small increase in the world price because of corruption. Some of 
the rhetoric about the cost of the FCPA for U.S. business is exaggerated 
because, obviously, some opponents of the law want to exaggerate the 
harm. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you. Another question? 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am a Fordham alum from 1998, Cristina 
Park. Just as a follow up, in terms of strict enforcement here in the U.S., 
I am unaware of any corporate actors being actually incarcerated for 
penalties for lack of compliance. I know, for instance, in Korea there is a 
push with regard to strict enforcement of political corruption because that 
is a huge problem; I think the largest portion of prosecutions is regarding 
political corruption of government officials there. Do you see potential 
actual harm not just in fines but in incarcerations here? 
TIMOTHY TREANOR: I think I can answer that question. There is 
an ongoing debate right now in the U.S. about the degree to which the 
Department of Justice should be focusing on individual prosecutions 
where there are corporate prosecutions. As we all know, crimes are 
committed by individuals, not by companies. Companies are simply legal 
entities; they are creations of the law. Actions are performed by people. 
When we hold companies responsible and not the individuals within the 
companies, are we really addressing the issue in a just fashion? 
To address these issues, the Department of Justice just a little over a 
year ago issued a memo clearly stating what really has always been 
Department of Justice policy, which is that where crimes are committed, 
the Department will focus on prosecuting individuals who are 
responsible. It is called the Yates Memo.31 It was issued by Sally Yates, 
who is the Deputy Attorney General. It basically put in writing the 
Department’s policy that in corporate prosecutions, there will be a focus 
on individuals. It requires companies that are cooperating, among other 
things, to present to the DoJ evidence related to the conduct of all 
individuals involved in the matters under investigation.32 It requires 
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prosecutors to rationalize in memos their decision-making with regard to 
individual prosecutions and to get approvals.33 It also emphasizes the use 
of the government’s civil enforcement powers against individuals without 
regard for whether an individual will have the ability to pay fines.34 
But that memo, although it came out with much fanfare, was not 
much of a change of anything other than a public statement that the 
Department was going to focus on these things. It is conceivable that the 
memo could effect some change based on the fact that it requires the 
creation of a formal process that prosecutors and company representatives 
must adhere to in order to demonstrate that individual prosecutions have 
been considered. But the real issue in my mind that is not resolved in this 
memo is that corporate prosecutions are much easier to bring than 
individual prosecutions which are typically much harder, which is the real 
reason that we see some corporate prosecutions without any individuals 
being held accountable. Prosecutors can use evidence of a collective state 
of mind against a company. They do not have to prove that any particular 
individual had the necessary state of mind for the offense. Combine this 
with the fact that companies are not likely to go to trial—they do not want 
to get indicted and end up out of business like Arthur Andersen—so they 
typically negotiate a resolution, making it a much easier path to bring a 
successful prosecution. 
Individuals, on the other hand, will fight for their liberty. Companies 
cannot go to jail but individuals can, and they will put the government to 
the test to avoid losing their liberty. When an individual is prosecuted, the 
government has to present evidence regarding the specific individual 
charged, his state of mind and actions, and has to prove it beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It is a much tougher undertaking. 
So, that memo has come out. I think the segment of the legal 
community that focuses on these issues is waiting to see if there will be 
any sort of change in the number of individual prosecutions that results 
from that policy announcement. Fourteen or so months in, we have not 
really seen any increase in individual prosecutions, but fourteen months 
is not a lot of time. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: Individual prosecutions are 
necessary, but in many cases the problems are systemic and go beyond 
cases of individual malfeasance. The problem cannot be solved through 
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individual prosecutions; corruption arises from organizational 
pathologies. 
TIMOTHY TREANOR: I do agree with that. There has been no 
shortage of corporate prosecutions for that very reason. But the outcry 
from certain sectors has been, “Where are the individuals?”—and in 
particular, as a result of the financial crisis—“How come no one was put 
in jail?” That is a very simplistic way of looking at things. It is not 
necessarily correct to presume every time you see a company that does 
something that may violate the law that there is a particular individual 
who is responsible. I think that would be wrong to conclude in a lot of 
cases. Interestingly enough, the world used to just be about prosecuting 
individuals from the criminal enforcement perspective. Then, we started 
seeing companies being prosecuted, and in some people’s view, the 
individuals got left behind. Now, there is more of a focus on prosecuting 
individuals, but I do not think anybody in the Department of Justice is 
leaving the companies behind. 
ZACHARY BREZ: I totally agree with you. I think just because bad 
things have happened—the financial crisis as the leading example—does 
not mean there is an individual who caused it all to happen. But I think 
the tricky part is for prosecutors to divide the cases into the categories of 
companies that have failed their employees and instances where the 
employees have failed the company. There are lots of instances where 
companies have trained their employees, monitored their employees, and 
used the appropriate legs of the stool of compliance—legal, audit, and 
finance—to ensure robust compliance, but there are just some bad people 
in the world. That does not always mean that the company has done 
something wrong. 
On the other hand, there are plenty of examples, as you point out, 
where the company has not done any of those things—it has not trained 
the employees, it does not have a compliance regime, it has no audit—
and it is the company that is letting those individuals down. To allow an 
individual in that circumstance to be prosecuted seems wholly unfair, as 
opposed to targeting a company that, as a whole, is often responsible for 
creating the type of environment where an individual would do that. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Mr. Brez. 
This is a good point to take a break from our symposium before we 
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PANEL II: GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS INTO CORRUPTION 
GISELLE SEDANO: Welcome back, everyone. We are going to 
commence the second panel on government investigations into 
corruption. I am going to go ahead and pass the floor to Mr. Treanor who 
will be sharing some of his experiences and his deep thoughts on this 
topic. 
TIMOTHY TREANOR: Thank you. As I said earlier in the 
presentation, I have been handling FCPA matters for almost ten years, at 
least on the private side. Prior to that, I managed some corruption cases 
as a prosecutor so I have seen a wide range of issues arising in a wide 
range of cases. In the private sector, you do not necessarily get to pick 
your cases; you do so somewhat on the prosecution side. On the private 
side, when clients come to you with problems, you are not necessarily 
defining the problem. You typically develop evidence establishing the 
facts and then perhaps help to articulate the problem in a way that is 
advantageous to your client. But the problems are what they are, and you 
deal with them. 
I have had the good fortune of handling FCPA matters for a range of 
clients in different situations, including U.S. companies with operations 
overseas and foreign companies who are under scrutiny related to contacts 
they have with the U.S. I have worked for companies that have come 
under scrutiny by the government in a number of different ways. I have 
self-reported for some companies and have worked for companies that 
unexpectedly received subpoenas or calls from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
Some of the cases I worked on are well-known. I handled the 
PetroTiger case,35 which was an FCPA case involving an oil field services 
company that was investigated for corruption offenses in Colombia. 
Executives of PetroTiger paid an employee of the Colombian state-owned 
oil company in order to win a contract.36 That was a really interesting case 
because I was brought in to conduct an investigation after the senior 
management of the company had been chased out by the board of 
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directors.37 The board of directors was made up in large part of 
representatives of private equity firms that held interests in the company.38 
The board members had very significant differences with the executives 
of the firm, and they were completely at odds for good reason. There were 
issues related to the lack of accurate financial disclosures to the board. 
The board pushed the executives out and then hired me to commence an 
investigation, and we found that the former executives—the co-CEOs and 
the general counsel—made improper payments. They asked me to 
investigate the issues fully, and I was asked to self-report the matter to 
U.S. authorities.39 
Those three individuals were later prosecuted by the DoJ. All three 
of them pled guilty. One of the former CEOs went to trial last summer.40 
The Department of Justice had a very difficult time at trial and ended up 
giving the former CEO a pretty sweet deal mid-trial, but he did plead 
guilty to FCPA offenses.41 
The company itself received a declination of prosecution, which was 
quite notable because it really is the only example of a company that had 
senior executives prosecuted for FCPA offenses but the company itself 
had zero consequences and received a written declination of prosecution 
from the Department of Justice.42 An investment bank obtained a similar 
result in a prominent case, but the individual defendant in that case was 
not so highly placed within the company as were the PetroTiger 
executives.43 
We obtained the declination by advancing a host of arguments. 
Among our arguments was that fact that this was a foreign company that 
had self-reported, and if the DoJ were to come down too hard on the 
company, other foreign companies would never self-report. We also 
raised the fact that the company itself did not appear to have made any 
money off the contract that it won as a result of the improper payments. 
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It was a $40 million contract, but our calculations showed the company 
losing money on the deal. At the end of the day, we also showed that there 
were significant efforts made by the company to stop corruption. The 
board sought to put in place an effective compliance program even before 
the misconduct and had called the ousted executives to task when they 
saw red flags, and then, after the issues were identified, had aggressively 
remediated compliance deficiencies. As a result of that and some other 
issues, the Department of Justice awarded the declination of prosecution, 
which was the best result the company could have received.44 
That case involved a foreign company being prosecuted in the U.S. 
for foreign conduct. The main connection to the U.S. was simply that 
some of the bribe payments had been routed through a bank account in 
New Jersey; so it was not simply some tangential act, but the actual bribe 
payments did come through the U.S.45 This case raised all of the issues 
that the professors have discussed regarding the merits of pursuing under 
the statute foreign companies with the resulting political implications. But 
frankly, the Colombian authorities were very much involved in that 
investigation and instituted their own prosecution of some of those 
individuals in Colombia, so there really was not a disconnect or any 
moment in which the governments themselves, either of the U.S. or 
Colombia, seemed to have a problem with the prosecution. 
More recently, a noteworthy case that I have worked on that you all 
have heard about is the FIFA case.46 I have represented for some time the 
Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association 
Football (“CONCACAF”). World football—soccer—is governed by 
FIFA at the top of the pyramid, but under FIFA are continental 
confederations that carry out a lot of the responsibilities for governing and 
promoting football. 
In this part of the world, we have CONCACAF, a confederation of 
member associations in North America, Central America, and the 
Caribbean, and it also has three South American countries that are 
members. Other continental confederations are also well-known, 
including the Union of European Football Associations (“UEFA”) in 
Europe and the Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol (“CONMEBOL”) 
in South America. There are also continental confederations for Africa, 
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Asia, and Oceania. Those confederations play very important roles in 
promoting and governing football. Relative to FIFA, the confederations 
are closer to the activities of their member associations, so in some ways, 
they are better positioned to govern conduct within those countries. The 
confederations are also responsible for running the World Cup qualifying 
matches, and they run regional competitions like the Gold Cup and the 
Champions League. 
CONCACAF, in partnership with CONMEBOL, ran the Copa 
América Centenario, which was held here in the U.S. over the summer. 
The finals were at MetLife Stadium, and I was invited to attend. It was 
pretty cool. Chile beat Argentina, and it seemed like every time Lionel 
Messi got the ball Chilean players pulled him to the ground. The strategy 
worked; Chile got a lot of yellow cards, but they won. The point being, 
however, that you do get some nice fringe benefits when you have a client 
in the right industry. 
The FIFA case is an extremely interesting case. It touches on many, 
many countries. The prosecutions thus far have been focused largely on 
individuals in North America, Central America, and South America, in 
part because the witnesses developed by the government are from those 
parts of the world.47 Forty-odd individuals have been charged. About half 
of them have now pled guilty, and a number are cooperating. One 
interesting thing to note about that prosecution is that it is not at all an 
FCPA case, even though it is a bribery case, because there are no 
government officials involved.48 The bribes that were allegedly paid were 
paid to football officials, but FIFA and CONCACAF are not government 
entities. Their employees do not fit the definition of foreign government 
officials under the FCPA. As a result, the case has been charged as a 
racketeering and wire fraud case as opposed to an FCPA case.49 It looks 
a lot like an FCPA case, and it frankly raises a lot of the political questions 
that arise in an FCPA case, but it technically is not an FCPA case. 
That case has given rise to an interesting debate about the role of the 
U.S. in policing football in the world. It is perhaps ironic that the 
prosecution is here in the U.S. out of all the football-playing nation, 
because football has not been so popular in the U.S. relative to some other 
countries, although the sport’s popularity is clearly growing steadily. One 
might expect that Switzerland, Germany, Brazil or some other country 
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would have taken this on, but it is the U.S. that has taken this issue on. So 
it raises the question: Why is the U.S. so aggressively policing corruption 
in football around the world? There are no doubt some very interesting 
answers behind the scenes regarding how the Department of Justice came 
to prosecute this case. And the investigation and prosecution has received 
full support from multiple agencies: Attorney General Loretta Lynch 
announced the indictments, together with the head of the Internal Revenue 
Service and my old boss Jim Comey, the head of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.50 The last I counted, there were nine prosecutors in the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of New York assigned to 
investigate and prosecute aspects of the FIFA case.51 I have never before 
seen nine prosecutors assigned to any single matter. The DoJ is clearly 
looking to take this case further and get more mileage out of it. It has been 
an incredibly interesting case to work on. 
If you know anything about the history of CONCACAF, the last 
three presidents have now been indicted. First, Jack Warner and Chuck 
Blazer (his general secretary) were found to have engaged in significant 
wrongdoing and were forced out of the organization. Then, Jeff Webb and 
Enrique Sanz ran the organization. They claimed to be reformers and to 
be changing the way football operated, but at the same time they were 
allegedly taking bribe payments on the side—kickbacks from marketing 
companies. They were caught and arrested, and Webb already has pled 
guilty. Then, the interim president, Alfredo Hawit from Honduras, was 
charged with taking bribe payments and seeking to obstruct the 
government’s investigation subsequent to the first indictment, meaning 
that the misconduct continued even after the case was first announced. 
Additional defendants and additional charges were filed in a superseding 
indictment, which was unsealed in December of 2015. 
There really are tough questions raised here: if you look at 
procurement, for example, you can see all kinds of places where 
corruption can work its way into a sports organization. An organization 
can try to build the best compliance program imaginable, but real 
challenges will remain in preventing highly-placed individuals within an 
organization from taking payments on the side in connection with the 
award of valuable contracts. The financial incentive may be there, and the 
opportunity may be there. The organization has to control procurement 
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and its contracting activities and make sure that there is no corruption in 
the future. 
But again, the topics under discussion here in this conference are 
very interesting to me because they go right to some of the questions that 
I deal with on an everyday basis. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Mr. Treanor. 
I also had the pleasure of going to the Copa América Centenario final 
and watching Messi cry when he missed his penalty shot. I feel bad for 
him. But maybe next year. 
Next we will turn the floor to Mr. Brez, who will be sharing some of 
his insights. 
ZACHARY BREZ: Thanks a lot. Let me start by saying thank you, 
Giselle, for having me today on the panel.  
You could spend hours talking about bribery and corruption and 
what we all do, and I have ten minutes, so I thought I would speak about 
the evolution of bribery schemes worldwide. 
There are times when folks think of evolution as a good thing. 
Everyone likes to think aliens are going to come down and they are going 
to be a more evolved species than us. There is obviously a chance that 
they could come down and be ten million years older than us, and that is 
not great because we are not going to learn that much from them; or, they 
are going to be very evolved and they are going to be like the folks from 
Predator or Aliens, and that is also a bad thing. So, evolution is not always 
great. 
What I have noticed is that there is an evolution in the bribery 
schemes worldwide. I spend a lot of time overseas, and I spend the bulk 
of my time in the space of two areas for our asset management clients. A 
lot of them are acquiring foreign companies that perhaps did not used to 
be under, or considered themselves to be under, the jurisdiction of the DoJ 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission but will be by dint of the 
fact that they are now being acquired by a large U.S. asset manager. When 
you are making an acquisition like that, you have concerns about how real 
are these numbers. If they are reporting sales of $100 million, how real 
are they? When they stop being able to pay bribes, are they going to be 
able to repeat these numbers? 
One of the things we do a lot of is diligence on acquisitions for our 
clients, which is going in and figuring out whether these people are paying 
bribes or not. That is hard enough to do if you are a federal prosecutor 
and you can subpoena folks. It is particularly hard when you represent the 
buyer in a certain situation. That said, we can fire folks frequently, which 
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the U.S. government cannot always do right off the bat, so sometimes you 
get a little more cooperation. 
The second thing we do is we get a fair amount of whistleblower 
complaints. Individuals at companies will call the ethics hotline or email 
anonymously and say, “So-and-so is paying a bribe.” There are a lot of 
reasons why people will do that; maybe these people are altruistic and are 
looking for the better good in the world; maybe it is a peer of theirs who 
they want to get ahead of; maybe they do not even work at the company, 
and they want the company to spend money on the investigation. 
I spend the bulk of my time conducting internal investigations where 
I am not sure there is anything there to find. One of the ways that you can 
speed up that effort is to know the bribery and corruption schemes that 
exist in certain fields and in certain areas of the world. Bribery and 
corruption, by and large, exist in three big touchpoints: in sales, in the 
movement of goods across borders, and in the permitting process. So, it 
is selling goods to government, and outside the U.S., lots of folks count 
as the government that you would not normally think about—hospitals, 
universities, etc. It is also moving goods from one country to another, and 
the permitting process. Think about Walmart in Mexico or the Lava Jato 
scandal in Brazil.52 The biggest scandal that would have been in the news 
was regarding tax individuals in Brazil collecting tax payments from 
companies to get their “Habite-se,” their certificate of occupancy.53 A 
couple of tax folks decided to shake down all of their taxpayers and they 
said, “You owe us a hundred grand in taxes. I will tell you what: if you 
pay me personally fifty grand, I will say that you paid the whole hundred 
grand.” Not surprisingly, some 4000 companies agreed to do that. It came 
to light because the folks who were the tax collectors decided to keep 
journals of all of their tax entries with the company—tax owed, bribe 
paid, date cleared. Good accounting. It turns out that is probably not an 
SEC violation because the books and records are accurate. It is, “Here’s 
my bribe; here’s how much I paid; you’re good.” But we do have— 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: They will be counting this as bribes 
in the statistics. 
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ZACHARY BREZ: Exactly, right. You do have bribes. 
One of the things that we look at a lot—and the professor referred 
earlier to Transparency International—is what is called the “heat map.” 
Figure 6: Corruption Perception Index54 
This is the Corruption Perception Index.55 The question is posed to 
all 193 countries in the world: how corrupt is your country? The results 
are color-coded: yellow is the least corrupt; white does not count; very, 
very dark red is the most corrupt. When you show this to foreigners, the 
first thing they remark is how their country is not as dark red as they 
thought it was going to be, which is great. I often point out that if you 
look at the U.S., we are not yellow.56 As we said, you have New York 
State, you have New Jersey, you have Cook County—there are lots of 
places in this country where we export some of our finest services around 
the world—i.e., bribery. But if you look at the map, it can help you figure 
out where to concentrate your resources. A company like Fortress is going 
to acquire a business that operates all over the world. The business is 
headquartered in France or England or Italy, but it operates everywhere 
in the world. You are not going to be able to look at all of their businesses 
at once. 
What you want to think about is this: how am I going to deal with 
the risk here? What is the most risky place for me to look at, for them? 
Part of what we look at is where the most revenue is coming from; what 
business line has the most touchpoints for the government of that sale, 
border crossing, or permitting process; and then, where are they in the 
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world? If you have a business that is in one of these dark red regions, and 
you are acquiring a business that has a lot of sales in one of the BRIC 
countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China—historically, you are going to 
want to dive in and think about how they are doing business there and 
how they are making their money. 
What you learn over time is that there are certain schemes that repeat 
themselves. It is hard to pay a bribe not in cash. The FCPA says bribes do 
not have to be paid in cash.57 So, you have a pricing issue: you have people 
giving out internships, etc. But at the end of the day, people pay bribes in 
dollars. Well, if you are a salesperson, frequently you do not want to use 
your own money to pay a bribe. You want to use the company’s money 
to pay your bribe, so you can get more sales and therefore a higher bonus. 
Then the question is: how are you going to convert to cash? How are you 
going to get cash out of the company? 
The most common way is a travel and entertainment (“T&E”) 
scheme. Individuals will submit fake T&E receipts. You do not have to 
generate that much money out of it actually—a couple of thousand bucks 
of those bribes can go a long way. If you run some analysis on it, you will 
get people who are submitting T&E receipts for trips on the same day in 
Hawaii and China, which are not happening. They did not have breakfast 
in both places at the same time. Or you will get people who are 
submitting—we see this in China all the time—enough subway receipts 
that they would have had to have been on the subway all day, every day 
for a whole month. They are salespersons, and they are doing that over 
time to build up enough cash in order to pay the bribes. 
Another really common way is the conversion of old stock—and I 
do not mean stock certificates; I mean stock that the company sells. The 
company sells a product, and most companies’ products have a shelf-life. 
At the end, the product gets destroyed. What if it does not, and instead, 
when it goes to get scrapped, some guy comes and collects it, sells it out 
the backdoor as a black market product? That is a whole separate concern 
for the company because it now has liability for the dangerous products 
that it has put back into the stream of commerce. But, more often than 
not, the individuals are collecting money out the backdoor to use that cash 
to pay bribes to make sales on the original products that they wanted to 
sell anyway. 
So, one of the things we look at is where the country is. 
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I think one of the surprising pieces is that, in fact, the really corrupt 
places are, by and large, places where people are not doing business; it is 
the failed states. If you are acquiring a business and all of its sales are 
coming from Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya, there are going to be some 
concerns. You are going say, “Those sales probably are not repeatable 
once we get rid of the bribery and corruption that is involved.” 
On the other hand, you have companies that say, “We make all of 
our sales in Scandinavia.” Apparently, Scandinavians are not very corrupt 
people, or at least want to think the best of people when they fill out those 
studies that ask, “Is your country corrupt?” Maybe it is just a sign that 
they are ignorant and the like, or willfully naïve. 
The thing I like to think about is how bribery schemes move around 
the world. I have seen this: I will go into a company in Spain where we 
have a whistleblower claim about a particular individual who is creating 
cash by returning old stock. You track it down, and it turns out he is 
keeping cash in a petty cash drawer and he is siphoning out the money. 
Flash forward a year and a half later. We have another client who makes 
a purchase in Spain, and it turns out the same scheme from that first shop 
has showed up at another store there. I have never seen a scheme like that 
outside of there. You do not see it again in Portugal; you will not see it 
again in France; but you are going to see it in Spain, and you are going to 
see it a bunch of times. For some reason—maybe it is the movement of 
people from one company to another; maybe it is the lore—within a 
country and within a particular industry, you tend to see the same scheme 
repeated over and over again. The benefit of doing this work repeatedly 
is that you get to see the same scheme over and over, and you get to ask 
questions such that the folks at this other table are suddenly like, “Oh, so 
you knew about that? Okay.” The reaction changes a little bit because you 
see it move. 
What is interesting on top of that is sometimes you see it jump. I had 
a case in Colombia last year where the bribery scheme was not one I had 
seen in Colombia before, but I had seen it in Italy. It turns out, in this 
instance, that one of the individuals at the company we were looking at 
had done a five-year stint at an Italian competitor’s company and had 
exported all of those bribery concepts back into his country of Colombia. 
I tend to think that it is interesting to track their movement. It is interesting 
to think about how the two sides chase each other, as individual 
employees look to find new ways to pay bribes so they will not be caught 
by their companies and the government. 
Thank you. 
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GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Mr. Brez. 
I am going to turn the floor over now to Mr. Cohn. I actually have a 
couple of questions based on all the remarks that have been made thus far. 
As the chief compliance officer of a publicly traded global investment 
management firm, what is your view on allowing companies to have 
compliance programs as a defense against FCPA violations? How do you 
think the regulators are going to permit that, if ever, in the future? Aligned 
with that, I want to know what would be a satisfactory compliance 
program that, under the scrutiny of a regulator, would suffice to be an 
actual defense. 
MICHAEL COHN: First of all, I just want to note that Giselle has 
worked at Fortress for seven, eight years now, and never before today has 
she ever called me “Mr. Cohn.” For the remainder of her time at Fortress, 
I am going to ask that she continue to do that. Thank you, Ms. Sedano. 
The first question was, “Do I think it is appropriate for a company to be 
able to use the quality of its compliance program as a defense to an FCPA 
or other type of corruption charge?” Is that the question? 
GISELLE SEDANO: Correct. 
MICHAEL COHN: Naturally, I think the answer to that question is 
yes. I think it is an interesting question because Professor Rose-Ackerman 
talked about the idea of a moral company. We have talked about the 
metaphysical concept of a company—which is really just a fiction, it is 
just something you create, it is on paper, it does not exist anywhere, you 
cannot touch it, but it is real—versus the people who express the will of 
that company. 
I do believe that a company can be so fundamentally flawed and 
corrupted by the expression of enough people and enough systemic issues 
that the company can be a bad company. The only way to solve the 
problems of that company are either to change its culture and its people, 
which is not something you can really do from the outside, so you have 
to punish that company in a way that the people within choose to make 
real changes or, in extreme cases, exact a punishment so severe that it may 
force the company out of existence. 
A decision by a prosecutor to punish a company is a very serious one 
because it can have an effect beyond the company—all the people who 
work for it, not all of whom are necessarily bad, have husbands and wives 
and children or other people who rely on them to go to work every day 
and earn a living. So, the decision to do something that will harm a 
company, even in a situation where the company itself is deemed to be so 
fundamentally flawed, is something a prosecutor has to take very 
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seriously. There are certainly cases where I feel like companies have been 
unfairly punished either by a prosecution or even by the way in which 
certain investigations into the company have been handled. 
When you look at the bad acts of a person or a number of people at 
a company, the fundamental question that a prosecutor has to look at, and 
the fundamental question that I, as the head of a compliance program, 
look at in thinking about how I design my compliance program is, “Am I 
doing the things necessary to show that the company put in place all the 
things we are supposed to do, such that we could reasonably expect that 
our employees knew what they were supposed to be doing, and that we 
took measures to make sure they were actually doing it?” If you do those 
things, if you express as a company that you are a moral company, that 
you are a good corporate citizen, and that employees, despite your efforts, 
act inappropriately, I think that the government should take all reasonable 
precautions to protect that company because they are not just protecting 
the company, but they are protecting all the people who work there and 
the extended group of people who rely on them to earn a living. 
This also goes to what Zach said earlier, that there is the idea of the 
company and the people, and who let who down—whether it was the 
company failing to put the employees in a position to know what the law 
is and act on it, or if it was the reverse, where the company did its job but 
the employees failed to carry out what they were taught to do. 
So, yes, I do think very much that a quality compliance program 
should be a defense to the company being prosecuted, and it should be a 
big red flag for any regulator who is looking at whether or not to prosecute 
a company in addition to any particular individuals. 
The second part of Ms. Sedano’s question was about what do I think 
are the pillars of a quality compliance program. I think they are pretty 
well established—not just for corruption and FCPA but really in general. 
A quality compliance program will, first and foremost, have taught the 
employees what they are supposed to do and not supposed to do in a 
variety of different circumstances. Fundamentally, that is one of the 
things the compliance program is designed to do, which is to tell 
everybody, “Here is the field of play for your behavior and you need to 
be inside the lines. And if you are outside the lines, you are on your own.” 
The way in which you do that is through training—be it training in person, 
online training, or training in the form of written communications to 
employees. 
Many people who are in-house—lawyers and compliance 
professionals and others—think about this as transferring risk from the 
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company to the individuals. The company has done all the things it is 
supposed to do, and if you as an employee go out there and violate those 
edicts, the risk is yours; it is not the company’s. Clearly, the company still 
has an interest in you behaving properly, but you have been made aware 
that this is the right way to act. That is first: training on the policies and 
the procedures and the way you are supposed to act. 
The second piece of a good compliance program would be 
monitoring, in an effort to detect and prevent improper behavior. It is not 
enough to just write a compliance manual. It is not enough to say, “You 
should or should not engage in this particular behavior.” You also have to 
take steps to monitor that people are doing what you have told them to do 
or what you have told them not to do. It is not enough to say, “Hey, you 
should never use your T&E account to try to pay bribes to other people.” 
You actually have to monitor people’s T&E expenses and look at them 
and say, “Do these make sense? Is there a reason why this person is 
suddenly spending so much more on meals and entertainment and tickets 
to sporting events or other types of things?” 
Those are really the two things: training and follow-up monitoring. I 
do believe that if the company does those two things and never turns a 
blind eye to perceived problems, those are adequate reasons not to go after 
a company. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you. Could you share some of your 
experiences where you have had business interests compete with potential 
FCPA or Anti-Money Laundering risks or concerns and how you 
navigated through those murky waters? 
MICHAEL COHN: Sure. I think a businessperson and a lawyer 
sometimes come at things in a different way—when I make decisions that 
are aimed at avoiding risk, a businessperson might say, “You are not 
being commercial enough,” and a lawyer might look at the same decision 
and say, “You are doing a sensible thing.” So, it is all about where you 
sit. But at the end of the day, when it comes to risks like FCPA and 
corruption, where the risk involved could be an SEC risk, but it could also 
be criminal risk, I (and others in my seat) take a pretty conservative view 
and try not to find out what is going to aggravate a regulator. There is 
some stuff that is very easy. You know, if someone wants to pay a bribe 
to someone in another country, you say no. 
But there are a lot of things that come up where it is not as clear that 
it is a bribe. You can easily envision a situation where you have an 
employee in your firm who wants to do a personal favor for a person who 
works in government in another country where your firm also does 
2017]      POLITICAL CORRUPTION: AFFLICTING AMERICA 545 
                                       AND AFFAIRS ABROAD 
business. The beneficiary is someone with whom the employee has a long 
standing personal relationship outside of any business context. The 
motive for the favor is merely in the spirit of trying to help someone out 
and there is no obvious evidence of a corrupt intent or other illegal 
purpose. So, in that situation, as a matter of common sense and humanity, 
you might say, okay, that seems fine. 
On the other hand, you can envision a scenario where your firm is 
also doing business with that foreign government, and a regulator would 
view your employee’s otherwise innocent good will as a bribe because 
the prosecutor will say, “No, it was not really just someone being nice to 
another person. It was actually doing a very significant favor for a 
government official.” It is sometimes hard for people, especially business 
people, who are not studied in the FCPA to understand how it could be 
that such a gesture of good will to a friend with no business purpose could 
still raise the specter of SEC or criminal sanctions. 
You asked, “How do you navigate through waters like that?” The 
answer is you have to educate people, and sometimes you have to spend 
time explaining to them how things work beyond the more obvious cash 
in a brown paper bag scenario, which I think is what the average 
businessperson readily recognizes while not recognizing other more 
nuanced, and probably innocent situations which can very much end up 
creating problems. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Mr. Cohn. 
I am going to allow Professor Griffith and Professor Rose-Ackerman 
to reflect and provide their views or theories based on everything that was 
just said. Professor Griffith? 
SEAN GRIFFITH: Thanks, Giselle. I have a question for each of you 
guys. I will start with Mr. Brez. You were talking about the evolution of 
schemes to pay bribes uncovered in due diligence in the merger context, 
which I think is a very interesting context. I wanted to invite you to 
comment on the evolution of the FCPA representation that goes into the 
merger agreement, which I guess is a creature of the last ten years. I am 
interested in your view on how standard or customized that particular 
provision of the merger agreement is, how sharply it is negotiated 
between the acquirer and the target. Let me just go down the row. 
For Mr. Cohn, I think most of us would agree that the basics of a 
compliance program should involve training and then checking in on 
whether it works, following the audit trail to some degree. I think the 
question of how much to expend on that effort is contested. My question 
in general on this topic is: what should the role of the government—or the 
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Department of Justice or whoever the enforcer or regulator is—be in 
setting those kinds of standards? What kind of metrics should companies 
have to demonstrate in order to win the effectiveness-mitigation penalty 
thing? What metrics are available for these sorts of things? How can we 
prove what “effective” is or what is not? And what level of investment 
should the government insist on companies making? 
My question for Mr. Treanor would just be to invite him to speculate 
on the incentives of things like America cracking down on soccer; what 
was going on there? You mentioned that maybe there is some backroom 
thing going on at the Department of Justice. But it seems kind of crazy 
that the nation that uses a different word for the game is the cop of the 
sport. 
Those are my questions for the three. 
ZACHARY BREZ: I will start. I think that you are right. The 
representations and warranties language has changed, and has changed 
over time because there has been an evolution in the types of 
prosecutions—i.e., you will not find a businessperson today in a large 
company who does not know what the FCPA is, but you will find a whole 
bunch of them who do not think money laundering applies to them 
because they do not keep cash in banks in Miami, and you will certainly 
find those who think that the Specially Designated Nations List58 and 
Office of Foreign Assets Control do not apply to them because they do 
not sell goods to Iran. In fact, sanctions enforcement dollars are much 
higher now than FCPA enforcement dollars in terms of penalties. 
Companies are starting to get there. 
This is a long way of saying that those representations have gotten 
much more detailed. It is no longer, “Yes, we do not pay bribes.” There 
is a much longer, more detailed representation that involves 
anticorruption, so it will involve the U.S. and the U.K. Bribery Act;59 it 
will involve local bribery laws; it will be a representation as to money 
laundering proceeds of a transaction and what it is going to be used for 
because there is a whole host of indirect payment concerns and facilitation 
concerns; it will involve sanctions, etc. 
When we advise companies about having a robust compliance 
program that is designed to prevent, detect, and mitigate wrongdoing—
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those are the three umbrellas that everyone has. The thing you are most 
trained to look for as a red flag—and it has become pretty standard—is 
anyone pushing back on what are widely accepted market terms. So, when 
clients of ours are negotiating a deal, there is pretty standard market 
language about what the representation is going to say about use of 
proceeds, history of bribery, current investigations, disclosure schedule, 
sanctions, money laundering, and the like. If you get pushback where they 
say, “We are not going to make the representation that we have not paid 
a bribe in the last five years,” you are immediately going to say, “Okay, 
that is a red flag. Forget that representation; now I have to do more work 
to figure out which bribes they paid.” The level of representation is pretty 
standard. 
The ones that you do get negotiation over, particularly in the 
sanctions and money-laundering space where it is a strict liability offense 
in a civil context, are knowledge qualifiers. It is a tricky thing for a 
company to have a knowledge qualifier, as opposed to individuals, 
because what does a company really know? It is comprised of its 
individuals who work there, and how can you say that the conduct of a 
salesperson in India should be ascribed to a company as a whole? So, 
knowledge qualifiers are ones that are frequently negotiated and given 
over, particularly if there is no other incidence of past corruption. But you 
will not give a knowledge qualifier that says, for instance, “None of our 
employees or officers are currently members of a government in any 
country, are currently married to someone who is a member of the 
government, have never paid a bribe themselves; the use of the proceeds 
here will not be used for anything illegal, etc.” When it comes to 
individuals, you will not give on that but for corporations, you will. That 
is one example of things that get negotiated. 
But I think in general those representations are pretty standard, 
whether our clients are on the buy or sell side. 
TIMOTHY TREANOR: You know, Zach, I just want to address a 
few of those points. I also handle compliance representations and 
warranties in M&A matters, vetting opportunities for asset managers, and 
conducting due diligence in private equity investments. There is one thing 
about the typical representations that drives me crazy, and it is when the 
seller of a company is asked to represent that no one has paid a bribe in 
the last five years. No company can know that. I mean you cannot know 
that every single salesperson within your organization has never made an 
improper payment. In fact, it is very possible, for some companies in risky 
industries that make those representations, that improper payments have 
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been made and that a team of forensic accountants could find some 
improper ones among a sample of high-risk payments. Then, the seller 
would be in violation of the representations, and the deal could tank or 
have all kinds of negative consequences. 
I have had discussions with M&A lawyers before when I have said, 
“You know, it is crazy to represent to this because it does not reflect 
reality. You should be representing, ‘We have an effective compliance 
program. It comprises all of the most important elements. We have seen 
the following issues, we have taken them seriously, and we believe that 
we have addressed, in a meaningful way, corruption within our 
organization.’” And everybody looks at me and they say, “Yeah, Tim, 
that is great. But we are never going to get an agreement on that from the 
buyer, so we are just going to go with it as it is.” So, we end up in this 
world where sellers make representations knowing that they might not be 
true. 
ZACHARY BREZ: I think what is usually the result of those debates 
is a knowledge qualifier for the company. It is fair to say, “Do you, the 
company, currently have knowledge that you have paid a bribe?” If you 
had an investigation and you found out that the guys in India paid a 
bribe—not to pick on India; Brazil, wherever—the company then knows 
it. So, you should not be able to make the representation that, “Okay, none 
of the officers have, but we are not going to represent that as a company.” 
TIMOTHY TREANOR: But you come back to the exact same 
question because your knowledge is based on the quality of your 
compliance program. If you have a poor compliance program, your 
knowledge is not going to be worth much, and if you have a really good 
compliance program, your knowledge is going to be something that 
someone can rely upon. So I agree that the knowledge qualifier helps you 
get better representations, but it does not get you all the way there. The 
proper way to handle these issues should be for the seller to rep to the 
quality of the compliance program. 
ZACHARY BREZ: I agree. Sometimes you have, “We knew or were 
reckless in failing to know,” if you have some lousy compliance program. 
That piece of it is what is fought over usually. 
TIMOTHY TREANOR: Agreed. 
MICHAEL COHN: I think the question was broadly, “What are the 
standards for deciding whether or not you have effectively spent time 
doing the monitoring part of a good compliance program?” Is that it? 
SEAN GRIFFITH: What should your standards be for how good 
your training is? What should your standards be for how good your 
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monitoring is? How much do you spend? How much do you invest in 
technology to do it? 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: Maybe I can put the question in a 
slightly different way. It is clearly in the interest of business to have a list 
of actions that the government accepts as compliance with the FCPA. But 
I am not so sure that there is good evidence for the relationship between 
any particular list and the absence of corruption. We know very little 
about the means-end relationship between corporate compliance 
programs and actual violations. 
MICHAEL COHN: I think that there are a couple of problems in 
answering the question. One is that the question is always answered when 
it matters in hindsight; that is always the first problem with trying to 
answer the question. But I am going to attempt to answer it. The second 
issue with the question is that people use the phrase “compliance” or 
“compliance program” or “monitoring” in such an incredibly one-size-
fits-all way that it really escapes definition at the outset. 
A company that has fifty people versus a hundred people versus 
25,000 people has a different compliance program. There are different 
things you need to do. There are different ways in which you need to go 
about doing it. Frankly, whether or not anyone says it out loud, your 
ability to truly monitor a company with 25,000 people is just different 
than one where the entire company fits in a room the size of this and you 
get to know everybody’s name after a short while and you know what is 
going on with them and you see them every day. 
I cannot say what standard one would use in any empirical way to 
define what is enough money to spend on compliance or what is enough 
time to spend on monitoring. What I can say is that the way I think about 
it, when we decide how much of any given thing to do, is I try to approach 
it in a way that—short of having an infinite amount of resources—
someone could not look back at what I did and say, “You could have 
figured this out if you did this,” where “this” is not something 
unreasonable. 
That is not a helpful answer in terms of, “Well, what does that mean 
in my organization?” I think we could have this panel every year for the 
next 1000 years and no one is ever going to be able to tell you the real 
answer to that question. But I approach it as trying to figure out: is there 
any commercially reasonable way that I could be looking at something 
and have found something and did not? There is always better 
compliance, right? I could have 1000 people on my team, and they could 
be reviewing every single line item of every T&E report and every general 
550 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
ledger and entry. But that is not actually reasonable, and I do not think 
anyone expects you to do that. 
If we ever have problems that come up, then I say, “How did we 
discover that? Did we discover that based on something we were doing? 
Did we stumble across it by accident?” And then I use that information to 
look at new ways to detect issues. 
But at the end of the day, I think the reasonableness test is what will 
prevail when looking back at how you did something. I do not believe any 
prosecutor, no matter how zealous they may be, is going to look at 
something and say, “If you had 500 more people in compliance, you could 
have looked at every single thing and you would have found this.” I think 
they look at it and decide whether or not what you did was reasonable 
under the circumstances. I think your question is, “Well, what is 
reasonable under the circumstances?” and my answer is “Well, it depends 
on the circumstances.” 
ZACHARY BREZ: I was going to add that the notion of folks 
looking at issues with the twenty/twenty hindsight matters because what 
is unknowable now is what happened. What went wrong? And if you are 
talking about somebody paying bribes to build nuclear reactors in Iran, 
you are going to be held to a much higher standard than if you are talking 
about somebody paying bribes to sell telephone parts into some other 
country. Sitting here today, you cannot know it, and you cannot treat them 
all like the Iran problem. In some ways it is liberating because no matter 
what you do, if it is really terrible, you are going to get held to a standard 
that is not fair anyway. What you have to do is try to take the run-of-the-
mill reasonable line. 
The Department of Justice hired a compliance czar for this 
purpose—she was formerly at Pfizer.60 The idea was that she was going 
to be able to normalize compliance programs. They felt like everyone was 
putting compliance programs in front of them saying, “No, no, look, we 
have a compliance program,” and they could not evaluate what was fair 
and what was not. 
On the one hand, I think it is a nice effort by the government to try 
and normalize and standardize compliance. On the other hand, she came 
from a very big company, Pfizer, and—to Michael’s point—what you are 
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going to do at Pfizer is very different than what you are going to do at a 
fifty-person company, and the standards are going to be different. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: As I understand it, one of the 
differences between the new British anticorruption law and the U.S. 
statute is that the British law includes a presumption—an excuse—in 
which a firm can say, “I have a great compliance program, so do not come 
after me as a firm.” The U.S. has resisted that, and I think that the U.S. 
strategy is best. I would guess that the DoJ does look at the kind of 
compliance program that a firm has. But to have a per se list of things—
“if you do these things, then you are okay”— does not seem like a good 
strategy. 
ZACHARY BREZ: Under the U.K. Bribery Act61—you are right—
it is an affirmative defense if you have a compliance program and meet 
certain steps. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: First, a comment about FIFA. As you 
pointed out, it is like a perfect storm in terms of corrupt incentives. The 
World Cup is a major event that happens every—I am not enough of a 
fan—four years? How often is the World Cup? 
GISELLE SEDANO: Four years. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: So, it is a big deal. There is a lot of 
money at stake. It is an on/off thing. You cannot give everybody 5% of 
it—some nation is going to host it. And the people on the committees, as 
you pointed out, are often from relatively poor countries. There is a big 
pot of money that is sitting there, sort of asking to be taken. 
I wonder whether you have any ideas about other ways of allocating 
the venues. Should FIFA draw names out of a hat? Is there some way to 
avoid discretionary judgments concerning, not just the location, but, as 
you were saying, the marketing deals? And, Zach, it is fascinating the way 
innovation travels across borders, and it would be very interesting to trace 
that back and to look a little more systematically at how it works. But, of 
course, the kind of corruption you were emphasizing in your remarks was 
the kind that damaged the corporation. The top managers want to uncover 
it. The employees are engaging in fraud. Now, there are other types of 
corruption that increase corporate profits. I wrote a paper with a Chinese 
student about corruption in pharmaceutical contracts in Chinese 
hospitals.62 Some of those bribes were similar to the ones that you were 
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talking about—the money came out of T&E funds—but they were 
benefiting the company. Those who paid bribes were signing contracts to 
sell drugs. So, it does seem to me important to think systematically about 
the alternative ways firms gain and lose from corruption by their 
employees. 
Now, I have been struck, from looking at corruption for many years, 
at how similar the kinds of things are that people do when they are corrupt 
around the world over time, even over centuries. There will be interesting 
little wrinkles, but they do relatively similar things. 
TIMOTHY TREANOR: With regard to the FIFA case—and I think 
Professor Griffith had a question for me about incentives for the U.S. in 
bringing the case—frankly, I really think the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 
the Eastern District of New York stumbled across obvious criminal 
conduct in the U.S., decided to go after it, and uncovered this extensive 
web of—not to be funny here because the lead defendant is Jeff Webb—
similar conduct throughout the entire football organization. There are 
many other nations that have much more involvement and interest in 
football and whose representatives were implicated, but nobody was 
addressing the conduct so it really would have been impossible for the 
DoJ to look past it. 
And a lot of the charged conduct was happening in the U.S. It is not 
like just a single payment was coming through the U.S. Much of the 
charged acts of bribery had to do with the Gold Cup tournament in the 
U.S. The Copa América Centenario that was held here this summer was 
also the subject of some of the alleged bribe payments, related to 
marketing contracts. So, there were many improper activities in the U.S. 
I think the DoJ just discovered the conduct and decided that it was all 
worth going after. In some ways, I feel like the Department of Justice 
shamed a whole lot of other countries, especially Switzerland. What were 
they doing all of these years when all those bank accounts, emails, and 
other evidence were sitting right there in Zurich? Corruption in football 
has been a topic of conversation for years and years, but what did they do 
to look at it? Now, all of a sudden, they are actively looking at the issues, 
but it was only after the U.S. drew attention to them. 
I do not know exactly what the incentives were for the DoJ to take 
this on, other than simply enforcing the law, making sure that crimes that 
were committed in the U.S. are brought to justice. But I also see in 
operation this notion that we have seen as part of the FCPA—this 
moralistic notion that, “We are leaders in the world. We do things the 
right way. If somebody else is not going to address this misconduct that 
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we have discovered, we are. And we can rationalize that it has a sufficient 
connection to the U.S.” It is not like the prosecutors are going after crimes 
in every part of the world—it is mostly in the Americas, although there is 
speculation that the DoJ is looking at certain activities of some of the 
leaders of FIFA, and there are already charges related to the selling of 
votes for the selection of World Cup venues. 
Professor Rose-Ackerman asked about the way the organizations—
FIFA and CONCACAF—are structured. They are membership 
organizations—one nation or member association, one vote—and are 
structured similar to one another. Both organizations have made very 
significant changes over the last year in response to the corruption 
allegations that are directed at preventing corrupt activities in the future. 
CONCACAF has taken on independent board members. There has been 
an effort to remove executive functions from the Council of both FIFA 
and CONCACAF. The Council is now more of a policy body that 
determines the direction of the organization, with the General Secretary 
being in charge of its execution. So, there really is a separation between 
the types of decisions that are made at the Council and General Secretary 
levels that I think will be helpful in ensuring that the organizations operate 
legally. 
But not surprisingly there is a lot of work to do. I have been a part of 
looking at these issues to date, and everyone working on this has been 
very open about the fact that, within the organizations, the work is not 
done, and that the organizations continue to be self-critical in seeking to 
figure out how to address corruption issues. There really has been an 
infinite number of people studying these things. 
In the end, such organizations must do their best to put controls in 
place and create a compliant environment. And as with any organization, 
it may be that two, five, or ten years down the road a problem arises and 
the organization’s representatives say to the Department of Justice, “Look 
at what a great compliance program this organization has. We cannot be 
responsible for every rogue individual who is going to do something 
wrong,” because no organization can control for the behavior of every 
individual, and the government readily acknowledges that. The obligation 
is to do a reasonable amount under the circumstances, to be smart about 
it, and to make sure that your compliance program grows and changes. 
The mission at CONCACAF has been to put in place the best controls, 
within reason, to make sure the conduct does not continue. 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you, Mr. Treanor. 
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We will conclude with Mr. Brez responding to Professor Rose-
Ackerman’s question. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: It was not exactly a question. 
ZACHARY BREZ: It was a statement question. Part of what you are 
getting at is when you have individuals paying bribes in the sales context 
and it benefits the companies, is that something the company really wants 
to root out or not, right? 
I often have a tough time separating what the company means there. 
You have got a particular sales associate—maybe they are an agent; 
maybe they are a third-party distribution; maybe they are a rep—who is 
paying bribes to a hospital in some small town in some country that is not 
here. It is going to benefit them; it is going to benefit the company a little 
bit; it will probably benefit their manager; it will probably benefit their 
manager’s manager. It is going to stop at some point. 
The question you have is, at some level the enterprise as a whole is 
going to want to root it out, right? One of the tricky things that companies 
have to think about is—when you do these investigations, I finish it, I 
have a memo, the memo says, “Here are the steps we are recommending 
you should take: you should fire the following three people.” That is the 
line that gets debated the most: why did you pick this third person? Why 
did you draw the line here? How sure are we that it is not their boss? How 
many emails did you look at? Did you interview them? Why did you go 
this high? It seems like it is just that lower employee. That is where the 
debate is: how far up the enterprise it gets. It is rare—and I know there 
are big cases; Siemens is one of the leading examples—when the 
corruption is being sanctioned and authorized by the highest levels of the 
company. More often than not it is local-level corruption. 
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN: Willful blindness. 
ZACHARY BREZ: The question then is: how much does the 
enterprise want to get it right? And, is that the only place it is happening? 
Because the worst thing that can happen is you do a corruption 
investigation in one country and then you find out it is happening in 
another country because then the government is going to say—I have had 
the Albania-to-Zimbabwe conversation with the government before, 
where they say, “I do not care where you sell it. You do an investigation 
of the entire company in every country where there are products.” 
GISELLE SEDANO: Thank you. 
On behalf of the Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, I want to 
thank you for attending the symposium today. I would like to specifically 
thank all of our panelists. Thank you so much for the interesting and 
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thought-provoking questions, for contributing to a truly meaningful and 
honest discussion about the multifaceted and pervasive problem of 
corruption. 
Before we head into the cocktail reception, I want to have an 
opportunity to thank everybody involved. 
Mr. Treanor, who is a Fordham Law alum, thank you for honoring 
us a panelist. One of Fordham Law’s greatest strengths is the alumni’s 
longstanding commitment to the school, and the Journal is very grateful 
to have its alumni come here and support the Symposium today. 
Mr. Brez, Mr. Cohn, Professor Rose-Ackerman, and Professor 
Griffith, thank you for dedicating your valuable time to this event and for 
sharing your insights with us today. 
Professor Caroline Gentile, who is here in the audience with us, and 
Professor Griffith, our Journal’s faculty advisors, you provided immense 
support and guidance in organizing today’s event and overall in our law 
school careers here. The Journal is very grateful to have such dedicated 
faculty, and today’s symposium would not have been possible without 
you. 
I would also like to thank Julian Phillippi and Shanelle Holley for all 
their assistance concerning organization for today’s event. Thank you for 
being responsive and helpful through the entire process. 
I would also like to recognize my colleagues, Shrisha, our Editor-in-
Chief, and Christian, our Managing Editor, and a special thank you to our 
Journal’s symposium committee for helping in multiple ways: Anna, 
Imran, Jeffrey, Mirin, Tess, and Jenny. 
On behalf of the entire Journal, I would like to thank absolutely 
everyone for making this an enjoyable event. 
 
